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David A. Johnson, on behalf of the Plaintiff/Appellants, Chris and Jill Magleby
(Maglebys) hereby provides their brief on appeal as follows:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This case involves the award of attorney fees. The primary issue is whether or not IRCP
54( e)(4) limits the award of attorney fees to a specific dollar amount plead for in a complaint in
the event of default after a defendant has appeared and contested the complaint. This is believed
be an issue of first impression in Idaho.

B.

Procedural History.

Chris and Jill Magleby, d.b.a. Selective Builders (Maglebys), filed their Complaint on
September 12,2008, against Kevin and Tanya Gam (Gams), Idaho Trademark Properties, LLC,
(ITP) and Jenks Brother, Inc., (Jenks). The Complaint requested the Trial Court to enter a
monetary judgment against ITP and Jenks based upon their breach of contract and to foreclose on
a mechanic's and materialmen's lien on real property initially owned by ITP, but subsequently
sold to Gams. Maglebys also sought the recovery of attorney fees. The pertinent part of the
Complaint relating to attorney fees read, "Maglebys are entitled to recover their reasonable
attorney's fees and Court costs of$2,500.00, pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120 and 45-513, if
uncontested further. If contested, the amount of attorney fees and Court costs awarded should be
the actual cost of attorney fees and Court costs." Kll
Jenks filed its Answer on or about November 4,2008, through its attorney, Joshua A.
Gamer, which denied the substantive allegations of the Complaint. R 36. Nine days later, Mr.
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Gamer filed a nearly identical Answer to the Complaint on behalf of ITP, again denying the
substantive allegations of the Complaint. R 43.
Garns filed their Answer and Cross-Claim on January 28,2009, which denied the
Complaint based upon a lack of knowledge, and sought to have the other Defendants responsible
for any recovery by Maglebys against Garns. Garns also sought damages against the other
Defendants for some construction defects. R 53.
The parties conducted discovery for a period of time. On January 21,2010, Maglebys
filed their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. R 94. Maglebys sought summary judgment
regarding the legal remedies (materialmen's lien and monetary judgment), but not the alternative
equitable relief of unjust enrichment. Maglebys, Jenks and ITP filed various affidavits and briefs
in support or in opposition to Maglebys motion. Jenks and ITP's primary objections were the
amount of money Magelbys were entitled to. R 83-119. Garns did not oppose the Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment. Maglebys, ITP and Jenks presented arguments on the Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment on May 21, 2010. The attorney for Garns was also present, but
presented no arguments. R 157.
The Court entered its Order Granting in Part Plaintiff s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on July 12,2010. R 168. The Court found that Maglebys had a valid materialmen's
lien against the real property and although there was a contract between Maglebys, Jenks, and
ITP, there were material facts still at issue as to the terms of the contract which could not be
disposed of without a trial. R 170.
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The attorney for Jenks and ITP then moved to withdraw from representing ITP and Jenks,
which was approved by the Court after neither Maglebys nor Garns objected to the same. R 189.
Neither ITP nor Jenks filed a subsequent appearance within the requisite 20 days after service of
the Order allowing the attorney withdrawal. On September 14,2010, Maglebys filed their
subsequent Application for Default against ITP and Jenks, together with supporting
documentation, including an Affidavit Calculating Interest and in Support of Attorney Fees and
Costs, requesting $14,904.00 in attorney fees.
The Court entered a Default Judgment against ITP and Jenks on September 27,2010. In
this judgment, the Trial Court awarded Maglebys only $2,500.00 in attorney fees. R 225.
Maglebys filed a Motion to Alter, Amend or Reconsider on September 29,2010 to correct the
reduction of attorney fees. R 228. This Motion was heard on October 4,2010, the day before
trial was to begin. The Court denied the same. Tr, p. 13 L. 17 - p. 16 L. 2. Maglebys then filed a
Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment. R 243. This Motion was heard and denied the
following day, just before the beginning of the trial. Tr, p 29 L. 20 - p 32 L. 2. After the denial,
some testimony was taken, but ultimately the remaining cause of action for unjust enrichment
claim was dismissed.
After settling attorney fees and costs against Garns, Maglebys started to foreclose on the
materialmen's lien against the real property (the "Cabin") which was the subject of this litigation.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo), who claimed an interest in the Cabin, filed its Motion for
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order to stop the sale, together with a Notice
of Telephonic Conference. R 515-518. Wells Fargo was not a party to the litigation nor did it
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request to intervene in this action. How they got the Court to agree to a hearing is unknown.
Maglebys' attorney prepared to oppose the Motion filed by Wells Fargo. Immediately prior to
the hearing, Garns delivered a check to Maglebys for the original amount of the judgment, which
was sufficient for Magelbys to agree to vacate the sale. Because the sale was voluntarily vacated,
Wells Fargo's request to stop the sale was deemed moot. R 564. Maglebys then filed a postjudgment Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees together with a supporting Memorandum on
March 15,2011, seeking $6,802.69 in additional attorney fees and costs incurred in collection
efforts to date. Such motion included attorneys fees associated in negotiating with Wells Fargo,
subsequent research, pleadings, etc., related to Wells' Fargo's injunction request. R 567-577.
ITP had re-appeared in the case (R 473) and objected to the attorney fees on the basis of the
default judgment being previous entered, that Idaho Code §45-513 was not applicable to ITP, and
that Idaho Code § 12-120 was not applicable because the attorney fees incurred were related to
the foreclosure action, not the money judgment against ITP. R 578. Gams objected on the basis
that Idaho Code §12-120 (5) required an original award under Idaho Code §12-120 (1)(2)(3) or
(4) and that Idaho Code §45-513 does not allow for post-judgment attorney fees. R 587. Both
ITP and Gams challenged the reasonableness of the requested attorney fees. Jenks still had not
reappeared in the case and did not file any objection to the request for attorney fees or costs.
The Trial Court entered its Order Granting in Part Plaintiffs Motion for Post-Judgment
Attorney Fees and Costs on June 17,2011, but allowed only $990.00 in additional attorney fees
which was only related to the foreclosure action and Gams. The Trial Court expressly denied
attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code §12-120. Maglebys' requests for recovery of fees related to
4 - APPELLATE BRIEF

the Wells Fargo Motion were also denied. R 611.
Maglebys subsequently filed their Amended Motion for Entry of Judgment, Decree of
Foreclosure and Order of Sale (Garns) and their Amended Motion for Entry of Judgment (Idaho
Trademark Properties, LLC and Jenks Brother, Inc.) on July 8, 2011. R 646 The Trial Court did
not issue its Final Judgments until November 9, 2011 R 703 and 707. Anticipating the issuance
of the final judgments, Maglebys filed their Notice of Appeal on October 4,2011 (R 685), and
their Amended Notice of Appeal on November 16,2011, (R 714), after the Trial Court entered
the final judgments herein. R 703 - 712.

C.

Statement of Facts.

ITP, is an Idaho limited liability company with its principal place of business in Rexburg,
Idaho. The managers ofITP were Brady Gardner, Chris Ferguson, Tony Jenks and Brandon
Jenks. The officers, managers, and/or owners of Jenks, were Tony Jenks and Brandon Jenks. R
103. ITP owned real property located at 3635 Redtail Street, Island Park, Idaho, where ITP was
building a spec cabin (Cabin). Jenks was acting as the general contractor.
Jenks had utilized Maglebys services in the past, including management of other
construction projects for Jenks. Previously, Jenks paid Maglebys 1.5% ofthe gross sales price as
compensation for their management services. R 138, 148. Brandon and Tony Jenks approached
Maglebys in July 2007 and requested Magelbys manage the construction of the Cabin, as they
had done in the past. Jill Magleby, an interior decorator, was specifically requested to handle
that aspect of the construction. Jenks promised Maglebys that in exchange for their management
services, Maglebys would receive one and one-half percent (1.5%) of the sales price of the
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Cabin. One percent (1 %) was to be compensation for management of the project and one-half of
one percent (0.5%) for the interior designing of the same. Maglebys were to be compensated
separately for the actual construction work the Maglebys did. Maglebys agreed to the
arrangements and thereafter performed as agreed. R 83 - 94.
While the Cabin was being completed by Maglebys, ITP entered into a contract to sell
the Cabin to the Garns. Maglebys were instructed by Jenks and ITP to work with Garns on the
finishing touches of the Cabin, particularly on the interior design aspects of the same, such as
paint colors, hardware, etc. The closing of the Cabin took place in December 2007. Garns paid
ITP $1,550,000.00 for the Cabin.
The managers/members of ITP had an internal disagreement as to who was responsible
for Maglebys management fees. R 91, paragraph 10. After not being paid for their management
services, Maglebys filed their claim oflien and subsequently the lawsuit herein. R 17.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the Trial Court err in failing to award Maglebys their reasonable attorney fees
incurred against ITP and Jenks?
In the alternative,
Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in not setting aside the default judgment
against ITP and Jenks?

2.

Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in failing to adequately award postjudgment attorney fees against all of the Defendants?

3.

Are Maglebys entitled to their attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho
Code § 12-120-(3) and (5), and Appellate Rules 40 and 41?
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ARGUMENT
A.

Standard on Appeal.

The issues on appeal involve the denial or reduction of attorney fees and the denial of the
Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, and are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.

Smith v. Mitton, 140 Idaho 893, 104 P.3d 367, (2004). Hihalka v. Shepherd, 145 Idaho 547, 181
P .3d 473 (2008). To determine whether the award of attorney fees was an abuse of discretion, an
Appellate Court applies the three-factor test as in Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power

Co., 119 Idaho 87,803 P.2d 993 (1991): "(1) whether the Trial Court correctly perceived the
issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the Trial Court acted within the outer boundaries of its
discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to
it; and (3) whether the Trial Court reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Burns v.

Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480,486-87,65 P.3d 502, 508-09 (2003).

B.

The Trial Court erred in failing to award Maglebys their reasonable attorney
fees incurred against ITP and Jenks.
In the alternative,

The Trial Court abused its discretion in not setting aside the default
judgment against ITP and Jenks.
The Complaint filed by Maglebys requested attorney fees, including containing the
following language: "Maglebys are entitled to recover their reasonable attorney's fees and Court
costs of $2,500.00, pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120 and 45-513, if uncontested further. If
contested, the amount of attorney fees and Court costs awarded should be the actual cost of
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attorney fees and court costs." After answering and defending the case for almost two years, the
attorney for Jenks and ITP withdrew. R 189. After neither Jenks nor ITP timely appeared again,
default was entered against them. In the default judgment entered and without a hearing, the
Trial Judge reduced the proposed attorney fees to $2,500.00, relying upon IRCP 54(e)(4). The
court held that this rule limits the Court's ability to award attorney fees beyond a specified dollar
amount as stated in the Complaint, even though Jenks and ITP had already both appeared,
contested and defended the case. In so doing, the Trial Court did not correctly perceive the issue
as one of discretion.
IRCP 54(e)(4) does not limit attorney fees after a Defendant has appeared and defended
III

a case.
Maglebys contend that the default as contemplated in IRCP 54(e)(4) is intended to apply

to a "no answer" or "non-appearance" situation. Black's Law Dictionary defines "default
judgment" as:
1. A judgment entered against a defendant who has failed to please or
otherwise defend against the plaintiff s claim, often by failing to appear at
trial.
2. A judgment entered as a penalty against a party who does not comply with an
order, esp. an order to comply with a discovery request."

Black's Law Dictionary, 7th Abr. Ed, p. 341.
The former is also known as a "no-answer" default judgment and the latter is known as a
"post-answer" default judgment. Stoner v. Thompson, 578 S.W.2d 679, 682 (Tex. 1979). IRCP
54( e)(4) reads:
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Pleading--Default Judgments. It shall not be necessary for any party in a civil
action to assert a claim for attorney fees in any pleading; provided, however,
attorney fees, when claimed to be allowable by contract or statute other than
section 12-121, Idaho Code, shall not be awarded unless the prayer for relief in the
complaint states that the party is seeking attorney fees and the dollar amount
thereof in case judgment is entered by default. Any award of attorney fees in
default judgments shall be subject to the other provisions of this Rule 54(e), and
shall not exceed the amount prayed for in the complaint. Any award of attorney
fees pursuant to I.C. Section 12-120, in default judgments in which the defendant
has not appeared shall not exceed the amount of the judgment for the claim,
exclusive of costs. (Emphasis added)
IRCP lea) states that the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure are to be" ... liberally construed
to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." The
latter language ofIRCP 54(e)(4) as emphasized above indicates that the scope of limiting
attorney fees is to a non-appearance situation. Once a party has appeared and defended in a case,
the limitations in this rule are no longer applicable, the appearing party having losing any
limiting or protected status. Under notice pleadings, if no appearance or answer is filed, the
extent of attorney fees would be reasonably known or anticipated. However, once a defendant
has appeared and defended, the extent of incurred costs is subject to a multiplicity of factors and
the ability to reasonably estimate the extent amount of attorney fees is lost. To deny attorney fees
and costs in this case after substantial additional attorney fees were incurred by Plaintiff, is
unjust, particularly if such requirement causes them to lose the relief to which they were entitled
through litigation costs. Nor is it prudent or just to allow defendants to contest an action for a
substantial period of time, and then avoid responsibility for attorney fees by their attorney
withdrawing, at the eleventh hour, in the face of almost certain liability.
Maglebys have complied with IRCP 54(e)(4).
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IRCP 8(a)(2) provides that a pleading setting forth a claim for relief shall contain "a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." IRCP 8(t) requires
the Court to construe pleadings to do substantial justice. Idaho is a notice pleading state.
Mortensen v. Stewart Title Guar. Co. 149 Idaho 437, 235 P.3d 387 (2010). The Complaint
herein gave more than adequate notice as to what attorney fees and costs were requested. "A
request for attorney fees should alert the other party as to the basis upon which attorney fees are
requested, in order that the other party may have a sufficient opportunity to object." Bingham v.
Montane Resource Associates 133 Idaho 420, 424,987 P.2d 1035, 1039 (Idaho,1999). IRCP
54(e)(4) requires that notice be given as to what attorney fees would be sought in the event of
default. Maglebys' Complaint accurately sets forth the amount, and provides adequate notice
that attorney fees, if Defendant contests the matter, would be equal to the actual attorney fees and
costs incurred. Maglebys submit that the language used in their Complaint is the common
language for pleading attorney fees.
In discussing Idaho Code § 12-120(1) the Idaho Supreme Court has stated that this statute

was intended to discourage litigation and to encourage early settlement by "requiring that the
pleadings warn the parties that this statute will be invoked for mandatory attorney fees." Cox v.
Mueller 125 Idaho 734, 737, 874 P.2d 545, 548 (Idaho,1994). ITP and Jenks knew or should
have known that once they appeared, they were subject to attorney fees in excess of $2,500.00.
They also knew when their attorney withdrew that if they failed to timely designate another
attorney to represent them, that default would be entered against them and they would be
subjected to the actual attorney fees incurred by Maglebys. In Cox, Supra, the Idaho Supreme
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Court held that in pleading dollar amounts, it was adequate to plead "$25,000.00 or less." The
sum certain of $2,500.00 ifno answer is filed and thereafter more attorney's fees are requested if
contested is adequate. A range of amount is sufficient.
IRCP 54(e)(4) is subservient to other rules and statutes.
IRCP 54(e)(8) reads:
The provisions of this Rule 54(e) relating to attorney fees shall be
applicable to all claims for attorney fees made pursuant to section
12-121, Idaho Code, and to any claim for attorney fees made
pursuant to any other statute, or pursuant to any contract, to the
extent that the application of this Rule 54(e) to such a claim for
attorney fees would not be inconsistent with such other statute or
contract.
The Court of Appeals has specifically ruled that:
To the extent that Rule 54(e) is inconsistent with LC. § 45-513, we
hold that the rule has no application and does not modify the
statute ... Thus, we conclude that upon the successful entry of a
judgment of foreclosure ofa lien claimed under I.C. § 45-507, an
award of attorney fees and costs is mandatory. The amount of the
award, however, is still a matter of discretion for the district court.
See Barber, supra. In determining the amount, the district court is
free to consider the factors ofLR.C.P. 54(e)(3) as well as those
considerations which are part of a prevailing party analysis under
LR.C.P.54(d)(l)(B)."
Olsen v. Rowe 125 Idaho 686, 689, 873 P.2d 1340, 1343 (Idaho App.,1994).
The Trial Court herein did not apply the correct standard to determine attorney fees. In
particular, it separated attorney fees between defendants and failed to recognize its discretionary
authority to determine the amount of attorney fees, based upon the circumstances. Garns were
held responsible for attorney fees related to the foreclosure action. R 479-495 Attorney fees
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against Jenks were limited to $2,500.00. The Court also erred by not including ITP and Jenks to
the award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 45-513 and 45-515. In Acoustic
Specialties, Inc. v. Wright 103 Idaho 595, 601, 651 P.2d 529,535 (Idaho,1982), the Idaho

Supreme Court stated that a contractor is liable for the payment of the underlying lien and
attorney fees related thereto. This court has also stated "It is well settled that in lien foreclosure
actions, the recovery of attorney fees is incidental to the foreclosure." Great Plains Equipment,
Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp. 132 Idaho 754, 771, 979 P.2d 627,644 (1999).

In the alternative to the proceeding section, The Trial Court abused its discretion in
not setting aside the default judgment.
When the Trial Court would not change the attorney fees set forth in the default
judgment, Maglebys requested the Court to set aside the default judgment to enable them to
amend the Complaint to request the specific dollar amount of attorney fees actually incurred.
The Trial Court denied this motion was well, stating:
And I understand the quandary that you're in when we're dealing with attorney's
fees and the fact that you've expended more attorney's fees in the case at this
point because of the initial appearance of the parties and now their withdrawal
from the situation- or actually not their withdrawal, but their lack of reappearance
after the attorney was allowed to withdraw. And I don't think that is sufficient
reason in and of itself, and so the motion to aside the default is denied. (Tr. 31 L
18 to 32 L 3)
Although the court identified the "quandary" and apparent injustice, nevertheless the Trial
Court did not reach its decision by sound reason. The same defies the scope of the rules which is
to " ... liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
action and proceeding." IRCP l(a). "In determining whether to set aside a default judgment, we
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must apply a standard of liberality rather than strictness and give the party moving to vacate the
default the benefit of a genuine doubt." Johnson v. Pioneer Title Co. ofAda County, 104 Idaho
727, 733, 662 P.2d 1171, 1177 (Ct. App. 1983). The Trial Court did not look at the facts as to
what was fair and just, but rather on some arbitrary burden of proof imposed by the Trial Court.

C.

The Trial Court erred substantially in denying post-judgment attorney fees.

The Trial Court granted Maglebys $990.00 in post-judgment attorney fees. R 621. The
Trial Court committed several errors in its analysis and award of attorney fees including: (1)
denying attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code §12-120 against ITP and Jenks; (2) not considering
Idaho Code §§ 45-513 and 45-515 in awarding attorney fees against ITP and Jenks; and (3) not
allowing attorney fees incurred in defending against a third-party's claims.
The Trial Court stated, as part of its ruling on post-judgment attorney fees:
The Maglebys are not entitled to rely upon §12-120(5) as authority
for post-judgment attorney fees. Idaho Code §12-120(5) is
predicated upon a previous fee award under Idaho Code § 12120(1)(2)(3)or (4). The Maglebys recovered attorney fees from the
Garns under Idaho Code §45-513. The Maglebys recovered
attorney fees against ITP by default. The Default Judgment,
prepared by counsel for the Maglebys, does not cite the statutory
authority under which such attorney fees were granted. R 618-619
There is no requirement that a default judgment must contain a statutory authority for the
award of attorney fees. Idaho Code § 12-120(5) reads in part: "In all instances where a party is
entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and costs under subsection (1), (2), (3) or (4) of this section,
such party shall also be entitled to reasonable postjudgment attorney's fees and costs incurred in
attempting to collect on the judgment." The focus of this statute is whether or not Maglebys
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were entitled to be awarded attorney fees and costs under one of the subsections of Idaho Code
§12-120, not the content of the underlying judgment. "When attempting to collect on a
judgment, a party may receive attorney fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(5) if that
party would have been awarded attorney fees and costs under subsection (1), (2), (3), or (4) in the
underlying proceeding." Credit Bureau ofE. Idaho, Inc. v. Lecheminant, 149 Idaho 467, 473, 235
P.3d 1188, 1194 (2010). Magelby's were entitled to attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12120(3). Maglebys' foreclosure action was necessary because none of the parties voluntarily paid
the same.
The Trial Court awarded less than 15% of the attorney fees sought for collection on the
foreclosure. Idaho Code §45-513 mandates that the successful claimant is entitled to "the costs
for filing and recording the claim, and reasonable attorney fees." Idaho Code §45-515 holds that:
Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to impair or affect the right of
any person to whom any debt may be due for work done, equipment, materials or
fixtures rented or leased or materials furnished, to maintain a personal action to
recover such debt against the person liable therefor.
Materialmen's lien laws are construed liberally in favor of the person who performs labor
upon or furnishes materials used in the construction of a building. BMC West Corp. v. Horkley
144 Idaho 890, 893, 174 P.3d 399, 402 (Idaho,2007). See also, L & W Supply Corp. v.
Chartrand Family Trust, 136 Idaho 738,40 P.3d 96 (2002) and Franklin Bldg. Supply Co. v.
Sumpter, 139 Idaho 846, 87 P.3d 955 (2004). The Idaho Legislature and Courts have stated that
there is the liberal, separate and distinct ability to pursue a personal action against the default
contractor, in addition to any foreclosure action.
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The amount of attorney fees regarding foreclosure is specifically determined by the
factors ofIRCP 54(e)(3). One of the key factors is the "time and labor required." IRCP
54(e)(3)(A). The Trial Court expressly disallowed any recovery of the cost of defending against
the third-party's claim, which was reasonable and necessary for the recovery of the judgment and
ability to foreclose. By not considering this and other factors, the Trial Court abused its
discretion.

D.

Attorney Fees and Costs on Appeal.

Magelbys are entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal against ITP and Jenks pursuant
to Idaho Code § 12-120(3) and (5). Credit Bureau, Supra.
At the present time, there does not appear to be any basis to request attorney fees on
appeal against Gams, as their involvement in this case is only as owners of the Cabin which was
subject to the lien foreclosure.

CONCLUSION
The Trial Court incorrectly interpreted IRCP 54(e), and Idaho Code §§ 12-120,45-513
and 45-515. Consequently the Court did not apply the correct standards for determining
reasonable attorney fees. Nor did the Trial Court correctly exercise its discretion in allowing the
default judgment to be set aside which would have alleviated the substantial proceedings
thereafter. Finally, the Trial Court did not reach its determination of attorney fees by the exercise
of sound reason. Maglebys should receive substantially greater attorney fees in the interest of
justice.
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Respectfully submitted this 24th day of April, 2012.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certifY that two (2) true and accurate copies of the foregoing was served by
placing the copies in the U.S. Mail postage prepaid on April 24, 2012, addressed to the
following:

Kent W. Gauchay
Simpson & Gauchay
PO Box 50484
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0484

Mail

Idaho Trademark Properties, LLC
c/o Brady Gardner, Manager
366 Talon Drive
Rexburg, ID 83440

Mail

Jenks Brothers, Inc.
Brandon Jenks/Tony Jenks
3680 Mountain View Drive
Rexburg, Idaho 83440

Mail

David A. fohnson, Esq.
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